Today we celebrate the 276th birthday of Benedict Arnold, the figure from the Revolutionary War whose name became almost immediately synonymous with ‘traitor’ and has remained so ever since. We tend to forget that until his shocking betrayal, Benedict Arnold had been a trusted hero of the revolution, having been promoted to general for his valor in key Revolutionary War battles from 1775-1777. What the American command had failed to register, however, was that Benedict Arnold, despite his successes, was a very bitter man. He had a long history of troubling rivalries and related grievances, including a failed court martial, and also was someone beset by financial problems. In the end, he offered up West Point to the British for twenty thousand pounds.
The birthday of Benedict Arnold today reminds us of why the framers of the Constitution were obsessed with the risks associated with mixing government service with private business, especially where it had to do with foreign powers. Old Europe, simply put, ran on patronage, hereditary prerogatives, noblesse oblige, and other similar things, which had a continually corrosive effect on parliamentary bodies and their activities.
From what I can tell, Arnold supported the revolt up to a point; he felt that the colonies had grievances that needed redress. However, because he hadn’t really internalized the ideals of Republicanism, he thought that the best bet was some sort of rapprochement with the Crown. He also claimed that the Colonial alliance with Catholic France was just a bridge too far. So, once it stopped being a mere revolt, and became rather a revolution, his enthusiasm waned. Finally, as mentioned, he felt slighted, passed over for plumb assignments, unfairly criticized for his performance as a financial manager, and “on the hook” for sums of money related to his command for which there was no clear accounting.
The birthday of Benedict Arnold reminds us of why the framers of the Constitution were obsessed with the risks associated with mixing government service with private business, especially where it had to do with foreign powers.
Sometime after September 23rd 1780, the day that revolutionary irregulars captured British Major John Andre (who was carrying Benedict Arnold’s secret plans to help the British take West Point) General Arnold was alerted to the fact of Andre’s capture. Realizing the jig was up, he made his escape down the Hudson on the British Sloop-of-War, HMS Vulture, and to his waiting commission as a Brigadier General on the side of the British. Subsequently, he led raids in Virginia and Connecticut against the Americans until the war ended after the battle of Yorktown in 1781.
We think of Arnold as a traitor, and not just as a turncoat, because his ignominy was more than just that of military cowardice and/or dereliction of duty. Arnold didn’t just switch sides (as mercenaries and conscripts sometimes did in the service of princes and other such actors); he sought, through his position of trust as commander of West Point, to betray the revolution itself, because he had the means, at least potentially, to deliver victory to the British through an act of subterfuge. Unlike true patriots then and now, the problem with Arnold was that he saw the conflagration as a mere ‘War of Independence,’ and not as a republican revolution; and since he also had mixed motives that tipped the scales, in the end he was for the British. But the revolutionary cause went far beyond breaking away from the English crown; the intent was to create a new republican political system with checks and balances, and with the goals of protecting life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for its citizens. Arnold then, having failed as a patriot, was therefore a traitor to the cause, a traitor to the revolutionary ideals themselves.
As it stands, Arnold was caught in the performance of a quid pro quo betrayal of his country to a hostile foreign power in a time of war. But what if it had gone down quite differently? Arnold took the risk of providing plans for taking the fort, because he needed to do that in order for there to be a quid pro quo if he wanted to get his money. Alternatively, he might have simply left West Point poorly defended, for example, and we might have never known that this general with foreign sympathies and financial motives, had violated the trust of his (military) office. To me, the most interesting thing here is the great difficulty (of which the Framers were aware) of discerning motives truly where motives are mixed. Did Arnold betray the Colonials because he was a secret monarchist? There is no evidence to support. Did he do it because he was an especially sincere Protestant? Again, there is no evidence. Or did it have mostly to do with the state of his private affairs, his conflicts of interest? It is doubtful that even Arnold could say for sure, and this is the point.
As it stands, Arnold was caught in the performance of a quid pro quo betrayal of his country to a hostile foreign power in a time of war. But what if it had gone down quite differently?
Finally, what if Arnold had found a way to bide his time, to hide his lack of revolutionary zeal, and instead found other means, after the conflict had ended, to enrich himself, his family, and his associates through murky financial arrangements with British partners who stood to benefit in various ways from decisions he made, perhaps as a political appointee or as a member of the post-Revolutionary War Congress? If it had gone down in such a fashion, Arnold would have likely had both revenge upon his rivals and the desired remuneration, and his treachery might never have been known to history.
